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 We argue that large-scale asset purchases of the ECB lead to a decrease of the priced 
frictions in the targeted securities through a transmission channel. More precisely, we study the 
effect of the purchases of the inflation-linked central government bonds included in the European 
QE on the ILGB and inflation swap markets. Based on the liquidity transmission channel described 
by Christensen and Gillan (2016), we find that even if there is an evidence of this impact, it is not 
as huge as the one observed on the American market. We find that the difference in the liquidity 
premium varies from -0.024 to -1.152 basis points at five-year maturity, and from 0.166 to -1.182 
basis points at ten-year maturity. 
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American monetary policy 
 The Great Recession induced by the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to an 
aggressive response from the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy. The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) drove the target policy rate to its zero lower bound, and implemented a 
purchase of large-scale assets. According to the work of Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack 
(2010), Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
which analyzed the efficiency of these unusual monetary policies on the treasury yields and 
mortgage rates, the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases program was successful at 
stimulating the economic activity. Especially by reducing the term premium and improving market 
liquidity. Therefore, European Central Bank decided to implement the same kind of measures in 
order to revive its Economy. 
 
European response 
 Indeed, the European Central Bank introduced the Public-Sector Purchase Programme 
(PSPP) on the 9th of March 2015. The objectives of this Quantitative Easing as set up in the ECB 
report by Mario Draghi (2015) are several. The main one remains the control of inflation at a rate 
lower but close to 2%. The second one is to low treasury yields to stimulate investment with a 
cheaper cost of borrowing. He also specified that he will continue to apply such a monetary policy 
until he reaches the objectives.  
 In this work, we explore the effect of this policy on the liquidity premiums of the inflation-
linked central government bond and inflation swap markets. Several works find different outputs.  
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Korniyenko and Loukoianova (2015) analyzed the impact of the different QE in the USA, Europe, 
UK and Japan on the market liquidity, finding positive effect on global liquidity in USA and Europe 
while Arias and Wen (2014) argue that the large-scale asset purchases implemented by the FED 
created a liquidity trap: the excess of liquidity is hoard instead of spent which finally not increase 
liquidity and influence negatively the inflation. 
 
How does European QE affect the liquidity premium in the targeted securities? 
 This work is organized in the following way. The next section presents the particularities 
of the European QE and the liquidity transmission channels. Indeed, in this section, we explain the 
liquidity transmission channels through the ones the QE influence the long-term interest rates, and 
analyze the liquidity effects. Then we describe the inflation-linked central government bonds and 
their importance in the measure of the liquidity premiums. Finally, we see how the European QE 
meet the requirements needed to study its impact on the liquidity premiums. 
 In the section 3, we present our methodology. First, we describe and explain all the variables 
needed to run the regressions: the dependent variable which is the liquidity premium measure and 
the four control variables. We finally define the models use for the regressions (standard regression 
and regression with switch in the conditional mean), and the tables summarizing our findings. 
 The section 4 is composed of three subsections. They present the empirical results, whether 
there is an evidence of an impact of the QE on the liquidity premium measure. We compare these 
results with the ones found for the American QE2 and highlight the similarities and differences. 
Finally, we discuss about the possible causes leading to different findings. 
 The sections 5, 6, and 7 are respectively our conclusion, the references used for this work 
and the main appendices. The other appendices are displayed in another document.   
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2. The particularities of the European QE and the liquidity channel 
Liquidity transmission channels 
 The literature review gives us a theoretical overview of the liquidity channels used by the 
policy makers to influence both inflation and employment. Indeed, the purpose of implementing a 
QE is to affect interest rates through diverse transmission channels. It exists two main channels 
presented in the work of Hausken and Ncube (2013). First, the signaling channel corresponds to 
the information given by Central Bank and consists in providing information about the future 
purchases program. By announcing large-scale long-term asset purchases, the Central Bank keeps 
interest low in the future and prevent from losses. The impact on interest rates happens through the 
yield curve. Second, the portfolio rebalance channel happens when the Central Bank buys assets 
held by the private sector. Therefore, changing the relative supply of the assets being purchased, 
the sellers may attempt to rebalance their portfolios by buying substitutes: assets with similar 
characteristics as the ones sold. The effect is an increase of the prices of the assets purchased by 
the Central Bank and their substitutes, thus a decrease in associated term premiums and yields. 
However, Christensen and Gillan (2016) present a novel channel we use in this work to capture the 
effect of the QE on the market liquidity and therefore liquidity premiums which represents 
investors’ require compensation for assuming the risk of having to liquidate a long position in the 
security prematurely at a disadvantageous price. 
 Since Central Banks want the interest rates to go down, they do not care about the price 
raise implied by their unusual monetary policy (QE). Consequently, they eliminate the downside 
risk of the targeted securities and therefore, investors by submitting bids in the QE purchase 
auctions are less likely to face a disadvantageous price. Hence, market participants accept a lower 
liquidity premium. We notice that the main difference with the previous transmission channel 
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resides in the announcement effect which should not matter for this one. Indeed, the investors are 
only able to sell the targeted securities once the QE gets started. Hence, we expect a reduction of 
the liquidity premiums consequently to the beginning of the program. 
 
Liquidity effects 
 In order to measure the liquidity effects, we need repeated purchases of securities less liquid 
than treasury securities over long period and a suitable measure of the priced frictions in the 
purchased security markets. The European QE meets these requirements since it started in March 
2015 and is still in process (twenty months). It also includes repeated purchases of a significant 
amount of Inflation-linked Central Government Bonds (ILGB). Moreover, we calculate the priced 
frictions out of ILGB yields and inflation swap rates. We use it to find evidence of the liquidity 
channel, acknowledging that signaling channel and portfolio balance channel may affect it as well. 
 Thanks to the rational, forward-looking behavior of investors, these two effects arise in 
principle following the announcement of the QE program and not when this one is implemented. 
Therefore, we verify for significant change in yields at the announcement date. We find out that 
there is not significant change in yields (Table 1) and consequently ruled out the signaling, and 
portfolio balance effects as drivers of the variation in the measure of liquidity premiums in ILGB 
yields and inflation swap rates during the QE. 
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Response to QE announcement Maturity 5 Years 10 Years 
INGB BEI rates 
Jan. 22, 2015 0.834 0.95 
Jan. 23, 2015 0.834 0.91 
Change 0 -0.04 
Inflation swap rates 
Jan. 22, 2015 0.301 0.706 
Jan. 23, 2015 0.297 0.699 
Change -0.004 -0.007 
LP measure 
Jan. 22, 2015 -0.533 -0.244 
Jan. 23, 2015 -0.536 -0.211 
Change -0.003 +0.033 
Nominal yields 
Jan. 22, 2015 -0.021 0.366 
Jan. 23, 2015 -0.022 0.454 
Change -0.001 +0.088 
Table 1 : Response to QE announcement. This table describes the change in our data due to the 
announcement of the QE on the 22nd of January, 2015. All these data are rates so in percentage. 
The changes are never above 0.1%, we conclude that there is no significant change in our 
dataset. 
 
Inflation-linked central government bond 
 The European QE provides a good experiment for studying liquidity effects on the market 
of inflation-linked central government bond and the linked market of inflation swap. Indeed, the 
characteristics meet the requirements as seen in the previous section. Furthermore, Fleming and 
Krishnan (2012) argue in their work, that the characteristics in the ILGB market: smaller trading 
volume, wider bid-ask spreads and longer turnaround time than observed in the nominal bond 
market, are in favor of the existence of a liquidity premium. 
 
European QE program 
 The expanded asset purchase program which was announced in January 2015, started from 
March 2015 and is supposed to end in March 2017. The ECB stated that it consists in average 
purchases in public and private sector securities of 80 billion euros per month. It includes the 
purchases of covered bond, asset-backed securities, corporate sector securities and public sector 
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securities. Inflation-linked central government bond belongs to the latest category mentioned. The 
purchase of bonds represents 72,974 million euros per month, so by far the most important asset 










31/03/2015 11,070 9,741 8.12 
30/04/2015 11,148 9,810 7.9 
31/05/2015 12,144 10,686 7.11 
30/06/2015 11,97 10,533 6.87 
31/07/2015 11,975 10,538 6.91 
31/08/2015 9,926 8,734 7.09 
30/09/2015 11,851 10,428 6.96 
30/10/2015 12,195 10,731 6.98 
30/11/2015 12,903 11,354 7.02 
31/12/2015 10,443 9,189 7 
31/01/2016 12,347 10,865 7 
29/02/2016 12,44 10,947 6.96 
31/03/2016 12,411 10,921 7.05 
30/04/2016 18,985 16,706 7.18 
31/05/2016 19,573 17,224 7.31 
30/06/2016 16,888 14,861 7.44 
31/07/2016 17,247 15,177 7.6 
31/08/2016 12,368 10,883 7.69 
30/09/2016 17,188 15,125 7.88 
31/10/2016 18,016 15,854 8 
Average 13,654 12,015 7.3035 
Table 2 : Inflation-linked German bonds purchased by ECB. This table describe the PSPP 
implemented by the ECB in Germany. We notice the purchases arise in a regular basis (every 
month) and with large amounts. Indeed, the bond purchases which represent 88% of the total 
amount of this program present an average of 12 Billion euros per months in Germany. 
 
 This program includes two types of securities: the bonds issued by recognized agencies, 
regional and local governments, international organizations and multilateral development banks 
located in the euro area (12%) and the ones which are interesting for this work: the nominal and 
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ILGB (88%). As a representation of Europe, we choose to study the purchases made in Germany 
(Table 2). Indeed, Germany benefits of the biggest amount of purchase and consequently gives us 




 In this work, we use the liquidity premium measure created by Christensen and Gallan 
(2016). This measure is calculated out of two variables: it is the difference between the inflation 
swap rate and breakeven inflation rate. This measure captures the priced frictions in the inflation-
linked German bond and inflation swap markets. Indeed, an inflation swap contract implied a fixed 
payment in exchange for a floating payment equal to the change in the CPI used in the inflation 
indexation of ILGB while the breakeven-inflation is the difference yield between regular nominal 
treasury bonds and ILGB of the same maturity. In a frictionless world, inflation swap rate is equal 
to the BEI rate because without arbitrage opportunity, buying one nominal discount bond today 
gives the same cash flow as buying one real discount bond and selling an inflation swap contract, 
all of them with the same maturity. But in the real economy, some frictions occur in the market. 
The difference between the frictionless world and the reality is therefore defined as the liquidity 
premium measure. 
 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝐼𝑆#	 𝜏 − 𝐵𝐸𝐼 𝜏      (1) 
 
 Where 𝐿𝑃# 𝜏  is the liquidity premium measure, 𝐼𝑆#	 𝜏  is the inflation swap and 𝐵𝐸𝐼 𝜏  
is the breakeven inflation. We take the inflation swap from the Bundesbank and the breakeven 
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inflation from Bloomberg. According to Pelata and Dent (2013), although they vary technically, 
these instruments both predict inflation since they reflect the inflation expectations. 
 
 
Graphic 1 : Measure of liquidity premium from November 2009 to November 2016. The measure 
of the liquidity premium, which is the difference between the inflation swap rate and the 
breakeven inflation rate describes the frictions in the inflation-linked German bonds and German 
inflation swap markets. We can see that after the crisis these frictions were huge but slowly 
decreased since 2009. The difference is expressed in percentage. 
 
 This measure of liquidity premium combine the information in treasury yields, ILGB yields 
and inflation swap to isolate the liquidity premium from the inflation and monetary policy 
expectations. Indeed, since the cash flows of ILGB and inflation swaps are adjusted with the same 
German CPI, the connection between their pricing allow to reduce the part involved by the inflation 
and monetary policy. 
 In their work, Christensen and Gillan (2016) impose several conditions would lead to the 
restriction: the liquidity premium cannot be negative (Appendix). However, we can observe that is 
not the case here (Graphic 1). Indeed, the liquidity measure turned negative many times from June 
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2012 until now. We link this difference to the fact that Europe and Germany faced deflation 
expectations. The inflation swap rates enforce this hypothesis since it also becomes negative. 
 Other model-free measures of priced frictions exist. The most common alternative is the 
asset swap spreads used by Pflueger and Viceira (2013), but Christensen and Gillan (2016) 




 The four variables which aim to control the liquidity premium in the ILGB and inflation 
swap markets and therefore the bond market liquidity are described below. 
 The first is the New-DAX Volatility Index, it is the implied volatility of the DAX 
anticipated on the derivatives market. It represents uncertainty and risk-aversion about the near 
future of the general stock market as reflected in options in the DAX price index. We include this 
variable since an increased uncertainty about the future prices could drive the liquidity premium 
up. Hence, a positive change in the VDAX is expected to lead to an increase in the liquidity 
premium 
 The second is the Illiquidity premium. As describe in the work of Amihud (2002), the stock 
excess return (risk premium) is in part a premium for illiquidity, thus we decide to use the excess 
stock return of the DAX Index as a control variable. A positive change in the excess stock return 
should imply a decrease in the liquidity premium. 
 The third is the yield difference between seasoned (off-the-run) Treasury securities and the 
most recently issued (on-the-run) Treasury security of the same maturity. This spread capture the 
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liquidity premium in the treasury bond market, thus we expect to see a comparable movement in 
the liquidity premium in ILGB yield and inflation swap rates. 
 The last one is the bid-ask spreads Euro swap. The frictions represented in this spread can 
capture a part of variation in our liquidity premium measure. Indeed, it represents the uncertainty 
about the future inflation. 
 For the two last control variables, we use the 5-Years and 10-Years maturities we will 
separately use for the liquidity premium 5-Years and 10-Years maturities regressions. All the data 
used for the regression goes from the 10th of June, 2009 to the 11th of November 2016. The values 
in parentheses represent the T-statistic values while ** means the coefficient is statistically 
significant at a 99% level of confidence, * at a 95% level of confidence and without any star means 
that the coefficient is not significant. 
 
Standard Regression 
 To test the impact of our explanatory variables on the dependent variable, we use standard 
regressions at both five-year and ten-year maturities (Table 3 and 4) with, as a dependent variable, 
our measure of liquidity premium 𝐿𝑃# 𝜏  on the four control variables describe above: The New-
DAX volatility 𝑉𝐷𝐴𝑋#, the 30-days moving average of the DAX excess returns 
𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛#, the off-the-run spread 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏 , and finally the bid-ask spread 
on the currency swap 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏 . The 𝜏  represents the maturity. 
 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C + 𝛽E𝑉𝐷𝐴𝑋#        (2) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C + 𝛽F𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛#       (3) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C + 𝛽G𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏       (4) 
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𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C + 𝛽H𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏       (5) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C + 𝛽F𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛# + 𝛽G𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏    (6) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C + 𝛽E𝑉𝐷𝐴𝑋# + 𝛽F𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛#      
+𝛽G𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏 + 𝛽H𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏 	   (7) 
 
 Following the individual regressions (1) to (4) the explanatory variables gave us the 
expected signs beside the bid-ask Spread on the Euro swap which is not significant at five-year 
maturity and negative at ten-year maturity. Moreover, it has no explanatory power (R2=-0.0005 
and 0.0059). As predicted, a positive change in the 30-day moving average of the DAX excess 
return makes the liquidity premium decreases and a positive change in the off-the-run spread makes 
the liquidity premium increases. These two variables have the strongest effect on the dependent 
variable (respectively -1.048 and -1.012 for the first one and 0.797 and 0.694 for the second one) 
and remain highly significant with the greatest explanatory power. The other variables are marginal 
factors in explaining the variation of the dependent variable. Indeed, in addition of a poor 
explanatory power, the VDAX and the Bid-Ask Spread on the Euro swap even change their sign 
from the individual regressions (1) and (4) to the baseline one (6). We verify this hypothesis with 
the regression (5) which almost has the same explanatory power than the baseline one for both 




Tables 3 and 3: These tables describe all the standard regressions done at five-year and ten-year 
maturities. For a positive change of one basis point of percentage in the explanatory variable, 
the liquidity premium will change in average by the concerned value in the table (percentage). 
The R2 define the explanatory power of the regression. This model describes the control of the 
explanatory variables on the liquidity premium measure. **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05. The values in 
parentheses is the t-statistic. 
 
 Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Liquidity Premium measure 5-Year maturity 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 
0.394** 0.107** -0.300** 0.369** -0.270** -0.652** 
(-6.45) (12.04) (-45.87) (9.15) (-33.78) (-32.08) 
VDAX 
0.033**     0.015** 
(12.89)     (21.86) 
30-day MA Stock excess return 
 -1.048**   -0.11** -0.041** 
 (-81.20)   (-6.54) (-2.66) 
Off-the-run spread 
  0.797**  0.727** 0.754** 
  (151.06)  (61.61) (70.88) 
Currency SWAP bid-ask spread 
   -0.247  1.35** 
   (-0.16)  (3.63) 
Adjusted R2 0.0787 0.7734 0.9220 -0.0005 0.9384 0.9388 
 Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Liquidity Premium measure 10-Year maturity 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant -0.223** 0.262** -0.640** 0.613** -0.541** -0.849** 
(-3.70) (28.09) (-65.66) (18.12) (-38.49) (-35.57) 
VDAX 0.032**     0.015** 
(12.63)     (21.32) 
30-day MA Stock excess return  -1.012**   -0.152** -0.041** 
 (-74.40)   (-9.53) (-6.23) 
Off-the-run spread   0.694**  0.612** 0.630** 
  (139.13)  (61.89) (71.19) 
Currency SWAP bid-ask spread    -5.320**  -2.948** 
   (-3.54)  (-7.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.0759 0.7415 0.9093 0.0059 0.9133 0.9325 
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Regression with a switch in conditional mean 
 In order to see if the QE had an impact on liquidity premium of the targeted securities, we 
run a regression imposing a change in conditional mean following the European QE announcement 
(Table 5 and 6). To do so, we include two dummy variables 𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 which takes the value 1 until 
the 26th of January, 2015 or 0 otherwise and 𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸 which takes the value 1 from the 26th of 
January 2015 or 0 otherwise. The result is the creation of two constants, one before the 
announcement 𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 and the other one afterwards 𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸. A switch of sign in the constants 
would mean that the QE had an impact on the market liquidity. Therefore, we expect the constant 
to switch from positive before the announce to negative afterwards. 
 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽E𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽F𝑉𝐷𝐴𝑋#        (8) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽E𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽G𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛#       (9) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽E𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽H𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏     (10) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽E𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽L𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏     (11) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽E𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽G𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛# + 𝛽H𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏  (12) 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛽C𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽E𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄𝐸 + 𝛽F𝑉𝐷𝐴𝑋#       
+𝛽G𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛# + 𝛽H𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏 + 𝛽L𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑# 𝜏   (13) 
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 Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Liquidity Premium measure 5-Year maturity 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Constant pre-QE announcement -0.255** 0.203** -0.288** 0.813** -0.259** -0.611** 
(-5.63) (17.64) (-29.65) (24.05) (-24.52) (-29.74) 
Constant post-QE announcement -1.407** -0.081** -0.312** -0.318** -0.280** -0.706** 
(-27.04) (-4.68) (-31.39) (-8.62) (-25.40) (-31.90) 
VDAX 0.040**     0.016** 
(20.58)     (22.69) 
30-day MA Stock excess return  -0.938**   -0.110** -0.034* 
 (-61.37)   (-6.53) (-2.20) 
Off-the-run spread   0.789**  0.721** 0.729** 
  (115.57)  (57.97) (65.82) 
Currency SWAP bid-ask spread    -7.217**  0.68 
   (-6.09)  (1.81) 
Adjusted R2 0.5855 0.8288 0.9362 -0.5040 0.9375 0.9507 
 
 Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Liquidity Premium measure 5-Year maturity 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Constant pre-QE announcement -0.083 0.39** -0.763** 0.94** -0.661** -0.872** 
(-1.92) (33.04) (-48.30) (34.94) (-33.76) (-33.99) 
Constant post-QE announcement -1.265** 0.011 -0.597** -0.199** -0.515** -0.819** 
(-25.48) (0.63) (-56.70) (-5.97) (-36.39) (-33.39) 
VDAX 0.038**     0.015** 
(21.13)     (19.59) 
30-day MA Stock excess return  -0.864**   -0.134** -0.089* 
 (-55.04)   (-8.49) (-6.11) 
Off-the-run spread   0.744**  0.666** 0.648** 
  (105.37)  (57.69) (61.68) 
Currency SWAP bid-ask spread    -8.125**  -2.903 
   (-7.13)  (-7.29) 
Adjusted R2 0.6735 0.8436 0.9405 0.6083 0.9426 0.9536 
Tables 5 and 4: These table describe all the regressions with a change in the conditional mean 
done at five-year and ten-year maturities. For a positive change of one basis point of percentage 
in the explanatory variable, the liquidity premium will change in average by the concerned value 
in the table (percentage). The R2 define the explanatory power of the regression. This model 
describes the impact of the announce on the liquidity premium measure. **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05. 





 First, we see a little increase in the adjusted R2 values from the regressions without switch 
in conditional mean to the last ones with the switch. Second, the changes in the explanatory 
variables are tiny following the addition of the switch in the conditional mean, this encourages the 
choice not to allow for any switch in their effects on the liquidity premium measure. Third, a 
measure of the persistent negative effect of the Inflation-linked German bonds purchase on the 
liquidity premium measure is the difference in the estimated constant terms. Still from table 5 and 
6, we observe that the differences at five-year maturity go from -0.024 to -1.152 basis points while 
at ten-year maturity, they go from 0.166 to -1.182 basis points. Finally, we test the hypothesis that 
there is no change in the constant term after the announcement of the QE program. This is done 
with F-test which says that this hypothesis is rejected at a 99.99% of confidence level at both 
maturities. 
 From an empirical point of view, the results are not clear, indeed even though there is 
evidence of a change in the conditional mean, this one is not big. While looking at graphic 1, we 
can see that the main change in the conditional mean happened in three parts from 2009 to 2015. 
We also observe that when the European QE is announced, the liquidity premium is already near 
to zero. Then the implementation of the large-scale purchases by the ECB pushes the liquidity 
premium under zero.  We are now going to compare these results with the one found in the work 
of Christensen and Gillan (2016), concerning the American QE2. 
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Comparison with the American’s QE2 
 Right after the financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve implemented its QE, however 
it started to purchase Inflation-linked central government bonds during its second QE. The analyze 
of the impact of these purchase on the liquidity premium in these securities market revels that the 
announce of the QE2 had a big impact, steeply pushing down the constant of the liquidity premium. 
These results are confirmed by a counterfactual analysis added at their work. They found out that 
the QE2 persistently reduces the liquidity premium measure by an average of 10 to 13 basis points 
but the most interesting is the disappearance of this effect towards the end of the program. Indeed, 
that suggests the effect of the purchases is present only when these one are ongoing or expected to 
remain ongoing. We unfortunately cannot perceive this phenomenon in our model since the 
program is still in progress and might be extended even though Mario Draghi did not give any 
information about it, per the Wall street journal (2016). The decision should be given in December. 
In the next section, we discuss of the possible reason explaining why it exists such differences 
between the impacts of the QE. 
 
Discussion 
 The timing of the QE matters, indeed, in the USA we observe that the first QE was 
implemented right after the financial crisis while the ECB waited until 2015 to start its own. It has 
a huge impact on the findings because the first QE of the FED limited the impact of the crisis on 
the American economy and as described in the work of Kurov (2009), the decisions made by the 
Central Bank has positive effect on investor sentiment. Therefore, when they implemented the 
QE2, there were not unusual movement on the treasury inflation-protected securities market. 
Contrariwise, in Europe, the inaction of the ECB did not limit the impact of the crisis. Moreover, 
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the Eurozone face a sovereign debt crisis since many years (Greek crisis for instance). This climate 
of fear makes investors go to the safest assets like ILGB. This pushes the liquidity premiums down 
by the same transmission channel used in our model. This effect is even greater in our model since 
we take Germany which is the safest country of the zone as a representative for Europe. We observe 
this effect on the graphic 1, with the downward slope of the liquidity premium measure from 2009. 
 The effect of the European QE could have been reduced by the announcement of this one. 
Indeed, the ECB displayed confidence in the future and as seen before gave a positive sentiment to 
investors who then came back on the stock market. This phenomenon might increase the liquidity 
premium in the ILGB market since investors left this market. The stock market reaction after the 
announcement of the European QE: increase of the DAX30 index, enforces this hypothesis 
(Graphic 2). 
 
Graphic 2: DAX 30. This graphic describes the movement of the DAX30 (German stock 
exchange) from June 2014 to June 2016. The aim is to capture the change in the stock 
exchange due to the announcement of the QE. The value of the DAX30 is points. 
 
Further researches should be done to compute the effects of all these probable reasons. 
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 In his work, Elliot argues that the factor which could reduce liquidity in the market are the 
Basel III capital accord which regulate more the markets and make the business more expensive 
for banks and major securities dealers, the single counterparty credit limits which tighten the credit 
exposure of the banks and the Volcker rule, which prohibits the banks from engaging in proprietary 
trading. 
5. Conclusion 
 In this work, we argue that the large-scale asset purchases of the ECB lead to a decrease of 
the priced frictions in the targeted securities through a transmission channel. More precisely, we 
study the effect of the purchases of the inflation-linked central government bonds included in the 
European QE which got started in March 2015 on the liquidity premiums in the ILGB and inflation 
swap markets. 
 To highlight this relationship, we first describe the liquidity transmission channels. The two 
main channels are the signaling and portfolio rebalance channels. We put in evidence that the 
effects of these channels which should appear after the announcement have no influence on the 
liquidity premium measure. Therefore, we analyze the impact of the QE through the transmission 
channel described by Christensen and Gillan (2016). We verify that the European QE satisfy all 
the requirements: purchases of inflation-linked central government bonds must be large enough 
and make on a regular basis. 
 To empirically demonstrate this relationship, we use a measure of the liquidity premium 
created by Christensen and Gillan (2016) as a dependent variable. We then use four explanatory 
variables: The New-DAX Volatility Index, a measure of illiquidity (30-day moving average of the 
excess return of DAX Index), the off-the-run spread which is the yield difference between seasoned 
treasury securities and the most recently issued and finally the bid-ask spread of the Euro swap. 
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 The regression with a switch in conditional mean which was the one capturing the desired 
effect suggests that the purchases of inflation-linked German bonds reduce a little bit the priced 
frictions in the ILGB and inflation swap markets. Indeed, compared to the reductions observed 
after the American QE, the evidence of benefits from the QE on the financial market in Europe is 
small. The fact that the QE is not over yet does not allow us to witness the behavior of the liquidity 
premium after the end of the program. 
 We discussed then of the possible reasons inducing these low results. The ones which came 
in our minds are the timing of the QE implementation and the effect of its announcement. Indeed, 
The European QE came late after the American one which created an atmosphere of fear. This 
pushed the investors on the safest markets and ILGB is part of them. Therefore, it drove the 
liquidity premium down before the announcement of the QE, making our result less relevant. 
Furthermore, as presented in Kurov’s work (2009), the announcement created a positive sentiment 
in the market. Hence, the investors got back on the stock market instead of the bond market. This 
effect could have lead the liquidity premium up, cancelling the effect of the purchases in our 
regression. 
 However, there is no evidence of these effects in this work. There are only hypothesis and 
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𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝐼𝑆#	 𝜏 − 𝐵𝐸𝐼 𝜏   
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝐼𝑆#		 𝜏 − [𝑦#O 𝜏 − 𝑦#P 𝜏 ] 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝐼𝑆# 𝜏 + 𝛿#RS 𝜏 − [𝑦#O 𝜏 − (𝑦#P 𝜏 + 𝛿#P 𝜏 )] 
𝐿𝑃# 𝜏 = 𝛿#RS 𝜏 + 𝛿#P 𝜏 ≥ 0 
 Where 𝐿𝑃# 𝜏  is the liquidity premium, 𝐼𝑆#	 𝜏  is the inflation swap and 𝛿#RS 𝜏  its time-
varying liquidity premium, 𝐵𝐸𝐼 𝜏  is the breakeven inflation, 𝑦#O 𝜏  and 𝑦#P 𝜏  are respectively 
the nominal and the real treasury zero-coupon bond yields, and 𝛿#P 𝜏  is the time-varying liquidity 
premium of this last one. Everything for a maturity 𝜏 . 
